CVE-2025-30132
Remediation/Mitigation Strategy for CVE-2025-30132: IROAD Dashcam Unregistered Public Domain Usage
This document outlines the remediation and mitigation strategies for CVE-2025-30132, affecting IROAD Dashcam V devices. The vulnerability stems from the use of an unregistered public domain name as an internal domain.
1. Vulnerability Description:
- CVE ID: CVE-2025-30132
- Description: IROAD Dashcam V devices utilize an unregistered public domain name for internal operations. This allows a malicious actor to register the domain and potentially intercept sensitive traffic intended for the dashcam or its services. If the dashcam attempts to resolve this domain via public DNS instead of internally, it exposes the device to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks and data exfiltration.
2. Severity:
- CVSS v3.x Score: 9.1 (Critical)
- Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N (Network, Low Attack Complexity, No Privileges Required, No User Interaction, Unchanged Scope, High Confidentiality Impact, High Integrity Impact, No Availability Impact)
- Rationale: The vulnerability allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to potentially intercept and manipulate traffic, gaining access to sensitive data and potentially controlling the device. The lack of a registered domain as an internal identifier represents a serious security flaw. The Confidentiality and Integrity impacts are rated High due to the potential for data theft and device manipulation. The Availability is rated None, as in the CVSS score, there is no impact to the devices availability (functionality), if exploited.
3. Known Exploits:
- Currently (as of the provided CVE details, March 2025), no specific public exploits are detailed. However, the nature of the vulnerability makes it readily exploitable once the domain is registered by a malicious actor.
- Potential Exploit Scenario:
- An attacker discovers the unregistered domain name used internally by the IROAD Dashcam.
- The attacker registers the domain name.
- The dashcam, configured to resolve this domain via public DNS, sends requests to the attacker’s server.
- The attacker’s server can then:
- Intercept data transmitted by the dashcam (location data, video feeds, credentials).
- Serve malicious updates to the dashcam, potentially installing malware.
- Redirect the dashcam’s traffic to legitimate services after intercepting sensitive information (MITM attack).
4. Remediation and Mitigation Strategy:
The following steps should be taken to address this vulnerability:
Immediate Action: IROAD Vendor Responsibility
- Phase 1: Domain Control (Critical)
- IROAD MUST immediately register the domain name in question. This is the most critical step to prevent immediate exploitation. This needs to be done before a malicious actor registers it.
- Implement DNS Sinkholing. Within their own network, IROAD should configure a DNS sinkhole to map the vulnerable domain name to a non-routable IP address (e.g., 127.0.0.1) to block external resolution.
- Phase 2: Firmware Update (Essential)
- Develop and release a mandatory firmware update for all affected IROAD Dashcam V devices. This update must implement one of the following (ideally, both):
- Internal Domain Replacement: Replace the unregistered public domain with a properly controlled internal domain (e.g., a subdomain of a registered IROAD domain) or, ideally, move to using private IP addresses for internal communication within the dashcam’s ecosystem. This requires changes to the dashcam’s software and potentially the server-side infrastructure.
- Local DNS Resolution: Ensure that the dashcam only attempts to resolve the internal domain name through an internal DNS server (within the IROAD network) or uses hardcoded IP addresses for critical services. This prevents the dashcam from relying on public DNS resolution.
- Implement robust update mechanisms to ensure all affected devices receive the update.
- Communicate the urgency of the update to users.
- Develop and release a mandatory firmware update for all affected IROAD Dashcam V devices. This update must implement one of the following (ideally, both):
- Phase 1: Domain Control (Critical)
End-User Recommendations (Short-Term Mitigation until Firmware Update):
- (Limited Effectiveness): If technically feasible and supported by the dashcam’s configuration:
- Configure the dashcam to use a custom DNS server (e.g., a known-good public DNS server like Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1 or Google’s 8.8.8.8). While this doesn’t directly address the vulnerability, it may reduce the likelihood of the dashcam accidentally resolving the unregistered domain to a malicious server (depending on the configuration of the attacker’s DNS). This should NOT be considered a primary mitigation.
- Network Segmentation (if applicable): If the dashcam is connected to a network with other sensitive devices, consider placing it on a separate VLAN or network segment to limit the potential impact of a compromise.
- (Limited Effectiveness): If technically feasible and supported by the dashcam’s configuration:
Long-Term Security Improvements (IROAD Vendor Responsibility):
- Secure Development Practices: Implement secure development practices to prevent similar issues in the future, including thorough domain name validation and usage during development. This includes static and dynamic code analysis to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing of the dashcam’s firmware and infrastructure.
- Vulnerability Disclosure Program: Establish a clear vulnerability disclosure program to allow security researchers to report issues responsibly.
5. Communication Plan:
- IROAD should release a security advisory detailing the vulnerability, its impact, and the recommended remediation steps.
- The advisory should be widely distributed through IROAD’s website, social media, and email channels.
- Regular updates should be provided to users on the progress of the firmware update.
6. Monitoring and Verification:
- After the firmware update is released, IROAD should monitor for any reports of exploitation.
- Conduct penetration testing on updated devices to verify the effectiveness of the remediation.
Disclaimer: This remediation strategy is based on the information provided in the CVE details. It is essential to consult with security experts and conduct thorough testing before implementing any of these recommendations. The effectiveness of these mitigations depends on the specific implementation details of the IROAD Dashcam V devices and the attacker’s capabilities.
Assigner
- MITRE [email protected]
Date
- Published Date: 2025-03-18 00:00:00
- Updated Date: 2025-03-21 14:15:18