CVE-2025-30114
Remediation/Mitigation Strategy for CVE-2025-30114
This document outlines the remediation and mitigation strategies for CVE-2025-30114, a vulnerability affecting the Forvia Hella HELLA Driving Recorder DR 820.
1. Vulnerability Description:
- CVE ID: CVE-2025-30114
- Affected Product: Forvia Hella HELLA Driving Recorder DR 820
- Vulnerability: Device Pairing Bypass
- Description: The dashcam’s pairing mechanism relies solely on the MAC address of the connecting device for authentication. An attacker who knows the MAC address of an authorized device can spoof their own device’s MAC address, effectively bypassing the authentication process and gaining unauthorized access to the dashcam’s features.
2. Severity:
- CVSS Score: 9.1 (Critical)
- CVSS Vector: AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (Calculated from provided values, assuming “adjacent network,” “low attack complexity,” “no privileges required,” “no user interaction,” “unchanged scope,” and high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts.)
- Severity Justification: The vulnerability allows for complete compromise of the device without any user interaction or privilege escalation. An attacker can gain full control of the dashcam, potentially accessing sensitive data (recorded video, location data), manipulating device settings, and potentially using the compromised device as a pivot point for further attacks.
3. Known Exploit:
- Exploitability: High. The provided information describes a straightforward exploitation method. An attacker only needs to:
- Discover the MAC address of an authorized device (e.g., through network scanning or social engineering).
- Configure their own device’s network interface to spoof the discovered MAC address.
- Attempt to connect to the dashcam.
- Upon successful connection, the attacker has gained unauthorized access.
4. Remediation/Mitigation Strategies:
Given the critical severity of this vulnerability, a multi-layered approach is recommended:
Primary Solution (Preferred - Requires Firmware Update):
Stronger Authentication: Implement a more robust authentication mechanism that does not rely solely on MAC addresses. This could include:
- Password-based authentication: Require a user-defined password to pair a device.
- Challenge-response authentication: Implement a challenge-response protocol where the dashcam sends a unique challenge to the connecting device, and the device must respond with the correct answer (calculated based on a shared secret).
- Digital certificates: Use digital certificates to authenticate devices.
- Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Utilize MFA by requiring a second form of authentication in addition to the MAC address.
Firmware Update: Develop and release a firmware update that incorporates the improved authentication mechanism. This should be the highest priority.
- Secure Firmware Update Mechanism: Ensure the firmware update process itself is secure to prevent attackers from injecting malicious firmware.
Secondary Mitigation (Temporary Solution until Firmware Update Available):
MAC Address Whitelisting/Blacklisting: Implement a mechanism to whitelist authorized MAC addresses or blacklist known malicious MAC addresses. This provides a basic level of protection but can be bypassed.
- Management Interface: Provide a user-friendly interface for managing the whitelist/blacklist.
- Regular Updates: Monitor for and update the whitelist/blacklist with known malicious MAC addresses.
Network Segmentation: Isolate the dashcam on a separate network segment with limited access to other devices. This reduces the potential impact if the dashcam is compromised.
Monitoring and Intrusion Detection: Implement network monitoring and intrusion detection systems to detect suspicious activity, such as MAC address spoofing or unauthorized access attempts.
Regular Security Audits: Perform regular security audits to identify and address potential vulnerabilities.
User Awareness: Educate users about the risks of connecting to untrusted networks and the importance of keeping their dashcam’s firmware up to date.
5. Implementation Steps:
- Assessment: Conduct a thorough assessment of the affected devices to understand the scope of the vulnerability.
- Development: Develop a secure firmware update that addresses the vulnerability.
- Testing: Rigorously test the firmware update to ensure that it effectively mitigates the vulnerability without introducing new issues.
- Deployment: Release the firmware update to users, along with clear instructions on how to install it.
- Monitoring: Continuously monitor the security posture of the affected devices to detect any signs of exploitation.
6. Communication:
- Vendor Notification: The vendor (Forvia Hella) should be immediately notified of this vulnerability.
- Public Disclosure (Coordinated): Once a patch or mitigation strategy is available, coordinate with security researchers and vulnerability databases to disclose the vulnerability publicly.
- User Communication: Communicate the vulnerability to users of the affected dashcam and provide clear instructions on how to install the firmware update or implement the recommended mitigation strategies.
7. Long-Term Strategy:
- Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL): Implement a robust SDL to ensure that future products are developed with security in mind.
- Vulnerability Disclosure Program: Establish a vulnerability disclosure program to encourage security researchers to report vulnerabilities responsibly.
- Regular Security Training: Provide regular security training to developers and other employees.
Important Considerations:
- The provided mitigation strategies are based on the limited information available. A more thorough assessment may be required to identify and address all potential risks.
- The effectiveness of the mitigation strategies will depend on the specific implementation and environment.
- It is important to continuously monitor the security posture of the affected devices and adapt the mitigation strategies as necessary.
- Prioritize patching with a robust authentication mechanism. The other solutions are temporary workarounds.
Assigner
- MITRE [email protected]
Date
- Published Date: 2025-03-18 15:16:03
- Updated Date: 2025-03-21 18:15:40