Remediation/Mitigation Strategy for CVE-2025-24490: Mattermost SQL Injection Vulnerability

This document outlines the remediation and mitigation strategy for CVE-2025-24490, a SQL injection vulnerability affecting Mattermost.

1. Vulnerability Description:

  • Vulnerability: SQL Injection
  • Affected Product: Mattermost
  • Affected Versions: Mattermost versions 10.4.x <= 10.4.1, 9.11.x <= 9.11.7, 10.3.x <= 10.3.2, 10.2.x <= 10.2.2
  • Description: The affected Mattermost versions fail to use prepared statements in the SQL query for boards reordering. This allows an attacker to inject malicious SQL code into the query when reordering specially crafted boards categories. This allows an attacker to retrieve data from the database.
  • Reported by: [email protected]

2. Severity Assessment:

  • CVSS Score: 9.6 (Critical)
  • CVSS Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N (Based on the provided data, and assuming the attacker can trigger the injection via crafted input).
  • Severity: Critical
  • Explanation: The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to potentially retrieve sensitive data from the Mattermost database. Depending on the database schema and permissions, this could include user credentials, private messages, configuration settings, and other critical information. The ability to inject SQL code implies a severe compromise of data confidentiality.

3. Known Exploits:

  • The provided information indicates that a specially crafted boards category is required to trigger the vulnerability.
  • The specific SQL injection payload would need to be crafted to extract the desired information from the database. This may require some reverse engineering of the boards category and the reordering functionality to determine injection points and the database schema.

4. Remediation Strategy:

The primary goal is to eliminate the SQL injection vulnerability by implementing proper input validation and using parameterized queries.

  • Immediate Action (Mitigation):

    • Disable or Restrict Board Category Reordering: As a temporary measure, consider disabling the board category reordering feature or restrict its use to a limited number of trusted administrators until a permanent fix is applied. This will reduce the attack surface.
    • Web Application Firewall (WAF) Rule: Implement a WAF rule that inspects requests for suspicious characters and patterns commonly associated with SQL injection attacks, specifically targeting the boards reordering functionality. While not a complete solution, this can provide an extra layer of defense.
  • Long-Term Solution (Remediation):

    • Upgrade to a Patched Version: The most effective solution is to upgrade Mattermost to a patched version that addresses CVE-2025-24490. Refer to the official Mattermost security advisories and release notes for the specific version containing the fix. This is the recommended solution.

    • Implement Prepared Statements (Parameterized Queries): In the affected code related to boards reordering, replace direct string concatenation with prepared statements (also known as parameterized queries). This ensures that user-supplied input is treated as data rather than executable SQL code. Here is an example in psuedocode: // Vulnerable code (example) String query = “SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ‘” + userInput + “’”; executeQuery(query);

      // Remediation using prepared statement PreparedStatement pstmt = connection.prepareStatement(“SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ?”); pstmt.setString(1, userInput); ResultSet rs = pstmt.executeQuery(); * Input Validation: Implement robust input validation on all user-supplied data, particularly related to boards category names and any parameters used in the reordering process. This should include:

      • Allowlisting: Define a strict character set that is allowed for board category names and other relevant input fields. Reject any input that contains characters outside of this allowlist.
      • Escaping: If input validation alone is not sufficient, properly escape any potentially malicious characters before using the data in SQL queries. However, prepared statements are the preferred approach.
      • Length Limits: Enforce reasonable length limits on input fields to prevent excessively long inputs that could be used for injection attacks.
  • Testing:

    • Penetration Testing: After applying the fix, conduct thorough penetration testing to verify that the SQL injection vulnerability has been successfully remediated. This should include testing with a variety of malicious payloads.
    • Code Review: Perform a code review of the affected code to ensure that the fix has been implemented correctly and that no other SQL injection vulnerabilities are present.

5. Communication:

  • Internal Communication: Inform all relevant teams (IT, Security, Development) about the vulnerability and the remediation steps.
  • User Communication: If the mitigation steps involve disabling or restricting features, communicate this to users transparently and provide an estimated timeframe for the fix.

6. Timeline:

  • Mitigation (Immediate Action): Within 24 hours of notification.
  • Remediation (Patch Application): Within 72 hours of patch availability.
  • Testing: Within 24 hours of patch application.

7. Roles and Responsibilities:

  • Security Team: Vulnerability assessment, threat intelligence, penetration testing, WAF configuration.
  • IT Team: Patch deployment, system configuration.
  • Development Team: Code review, remediation implementation.
  • Communication Team: Internal and external communication.

8. Post-Incident Review:

After the remediation is complete, conduct a post-incident review to identify lessons learned and improve the organization’s security posture. This should include:

  • How the vulnerability was discovered.
  • The effectiveness of the remediation efforts.
  • Any gaps in the security process that need to be addressed.
  • Steps to prevent similar vulnerabilities in the future.